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THE MYTH OF FOURTH AMENDMENT CIRCULARITY 
Matthew B. Kugler* and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz** 
 
84 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2017) 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States made peoples’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy the touchstone for determining whether state surveillance amounts 
to a search under the Fourth Amendment. Ever since Katz, Supreme Court justices and 
numerous scholars have referenced the inherent circularity of the expectations of privacy 
framework: People’s expectations of privacy depend on Fourth Amendment law, so it is 
circular to have the scope of the Fourth Amendment depend on those same expectations. 
Nearly every scholar who has written about the issue has assumed that the circularity of 
expectations is a major impediment to having the scope of the Fourth Amendment depend 
in any way on what ordinarily people actually expect. But no scholar has tested the 
circularity narrative’s essential premise, which is that when salient, well-publicized 
changes in Fourth Amendment law occur, popular sentiment falls into line.   
Our paper conducts precisely such a test. We conducted surveys on census-
weighted samples of US citizens immediately before, immediately after, and long after the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Riley v. California. The decision in Riley was 
unanimous and surprising. It substantially altered Fourth Amendment law concerning the 
privacy of peoples’ cell phone content, and it was a major news story that generated 
relatively high levels of public awareness in the days after it was decided. We find that 
immediately after the Riley decision the public began to expect greater privacy in the 
contents of their cell phones, though the effect was small and appears to have been 
confined to the 40% of our sample that reported having heard of the Riley decision. One 
year after Riley, these heightened expectations had disappeared completely. There was no 
difference from baseline two years after Riley either, with privacy expectations remaining 
where they were prior to the decision. Our findings suggest that privacy expectations are 
far more stable than judges and commentators have been assuming. Even in the ideal 
circumstance of a clear, unanimous, and widely reported decision, circularity in Fourth 
Amendment attitudes is both weak and short-lived. In the longer term, Fourth Amendment 
circularity appears to be a myth. The paper concludes by comparing the public’s response 
to Riley with its reaction to the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous Hobby Lobby decision 
and situates our results within the political science literature on attitudinal responses to 
significant Supreme Court decisions. 
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It is very difficult to find any proposition in Fourth Amendment law to 
which every judge, lawyer, and scholar subscribes. One striking point about 
which nearly everyone – left, right, and center – agrees, however, is that 
there is a degree of circularity in the Katz “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” test. Among those expressing concern about this circularity are 
Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and John Paul 
Stevens, Judges Alex Kozinski, Richard Posner, and George MacKinnon, 
and Professors Jed Rubenfeld, Dan Solove, Amitai Etzioni, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, David Sklansky, Orin Kerr, Michael Abramowicz, Mary 
Coombs, and Paul Schwartz.1 In this paper we show that this widely shared 
concern is misplaced.  
Justice Harlan’s opinion in Katz v. United States makes a person’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy the touchstone for determining whether 
police surveillance amounts to a search and, therefore, is subject to 
restrictions under the Fourth Amendment.2 Under Katz and the numerous 
cases that follow its approach, the government conducts a search when it 
invades an “expectation [of privacy]...that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”3 If the government’s surveillance intrudes upon such an 
expectation, the Fourth Amendment is implicated and the government must 
either get a search warrant or satisfy one of the limited exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. If the government’s surveillance does not implicate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable and no warrant is required.  
The exact meaning of Katz’s reasonable expectations of privacy test is 
controversial, but its text has led some scholars to argue that the test should 
depend in part on how everyday members of the public think about 
                                                 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 7-25. 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating 
that police conduct amounts to a search, thereby implicating the Fourth 
Amendment, when “a person [exhibits] an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy, and [when] the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”). The test from Justice Harlan’s concurrence subsequently became 
the key Fourth Amendment inquiry, embraced repeatedly by the Supreme Court 
over time. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The 
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether someone had a 
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”) (citing the Harlan 
concurrence in Katz); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (describing 
the Supreme Court majority’s application of Justice Harlan’s Katz test in several 
cases). 
3 Id. 
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privacy.4 And in some prominent post-Katz cases, the Supreme Court has 
said it is doing exactly that.5 The problem that many have identified with 
this approach to Katz is that reasonable people should expect the privacy 
rights granted to them by the courts. So expectations define the scope of 
legal protection, but the legal protections themselves should define the 
expectations. 
This potential circularity gives rise to a practical problem. Once the 
state begins using an investigative technique, and especially once the courts 
authorize the state to do so, ordinary people’s expectations of privacy may 
adjust. Thus, even if people expected privacy in a context at some earlier 
point in time, subsequent actions by the government can erode those 
expectations, enabling the state to conduct invasive surveillance in the 
future without having to secure a warrant. If this understanding of 
expectations is correct, the Fourth Amendment provides little protection 
against a government that acts strategically; all it need do is move slowly 
and publicize what it is doing. Further, the judicial determination of whether 
an expectation of privacy exists would be largely empty; even if the court 
gets the answer “wrong,” public expectations would in time adapt to make it 
“right.” For those who argue that the reasonableness of a privacy 
expectation should depend on whether the expectation is widely shared, this 
is an especially salient problem. If public expectations are mostly just a 
function of whatever the Supreme Court said last, then for the Court to 
account for such expectations would result in it talking to itself. 
The Fourth Amendment circularity hypothesis is intuitive and easy to 
grasp. There are just two problems with the circularity story: (1) there is no 
empirical evidence supporting it, and (2) an empirical literature in political 
science provides ample reason to doubt it. In this paper, we have gathered 
and analyzed new data that suggest that popular expectations of privacy are 
very stubborn. Though expectations move a little right after a landmark 
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decision substantially changes the law, 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Matthew B. Kugler & 
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 
and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 219, 230 (2016); Christine S. 
Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of 
Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015); Christopher Slobogin & 
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in 
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993). 
5 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
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within a span of months they snap right back to where they were beforehand 
and they remain stable thereafter. As best we can tell, the circularity of 
reasonable expectations of privacy is a myth. 
Part I of the paper presents the problem of circularity. At stake in this 
discussion is the feasibility of incorporating public expectations into the 
doctrine. If expectations are independent of current case law, then looking 
to public expectations can provide a correcting impulse against an out of 
touch judiciary. If, on the other hand, expectations merely reflect what 
courts have said, then there is no point to considering public attitudes; no 
information would be gained. The section begins by explaining the Supreme 
Court’s concern that expectations of privacy would become an empty 
concept, and that a government could strategically condition the populace to 
accept ever-greater privacy invasions. We then cite many Fourth 
Amendment scholars expressing the same concern. Lastly, we examine a 
literature from political science and psychology commenting on public 
reactions to Supreme Court decisions. This literature informed our 
skepticism that the public would uncritically mirror the Court’s rulings. 
In Part II we describe the case at the core of our study: Riley v. 
California. The case established a new rule for the searching of electronic 
devices incident to arrest, what can fairly be read as a “computers are 
different” standard. This case was perfectly suited to prompting a major 
change in public expectations. The ruling was clear, it was broad, it was 
surprising, it was unanimous, and it prompted a torrent of media coverage. 
As Fourth Amendment cases go, we could not have hoped for better; it 
stacked the deck in favor of finding a change of expectations, and yet no 
lasting change was observed.  
In Part III we present the empirical study itself. We recruited census-
representative participants in four waves: one right before the decision, one 
right after, a one-year follow-up, and a two-year follow-up. What we found 
was a small shift in the direction of the Court’s decision in the survey 
conducted immediately after the decision came down. But this shift was 1.) 
specific to the exact question in Riley and did not generalize to related 
questions, 2.) was present only among those who reported having heard of 
the decision, and 3.) disappeared the following year. Put another way, the 
Supreme Court manage to move privacy expectations only slightly and only 
for a very short period of time. Based on these data, circularity does not 
seem to be a problem.  
In Part IV, we examine the implications of these data for Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and relate our findings back to the political science 
literature on the effects of Supreme Court decisions on public attitudes. We 
also show that a nearly simultaneous Supreme Court decision, Hobby Lobby 
6 Kugler & Strahilevitz [23-Feb-17 
v. Burwell, had a short-lived polarizing effect on the public. This finding 
underscores the complicated interplay between the Supreme Court and the 
general public and adds further reason to believe that circularity is neither 
strong nor common. 
 
I.) THE (ALLEGED) PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY 
Prior to this study, many legal thinkers were concerned by the potential 
for circularity. Not long before his appointment to the federal bench, 
Richard Posner observed “it is circular to say that there is no invasion of 
privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an expectation 
will depend on what the legal rule is.”6 This sums up the alleged problem of 
circularity perfectly: Reasonable people should not expect more privacy 
than the courts have told them will be protected. If the level of privacy 
expected by society is both the cause and consequence of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, then the entire area of law reduces to a 
discussion of chickens, eggs, and primacy.  
The circularity of the Katz inquiry is an idea with a long and 
distinguished pedigree. The Supreme Court’s first recognition of the 
potential circularity problem arose in an opinion called Rakas, decided in 
1978. In footnote 12, the Court talked about the circularity problem:  
[I]t would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back 
on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are 
legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-
rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of 
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.7 
The Court is noting that it is illogical and unappealing to base whether 
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy on whether the court cases 
say he or she does.8 To avoid this kind of doctrinal circularity, courts are to 
                                                 
6 Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (1979) 
7 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
8 See, e.g., Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(referring to the “unmistakable circularity” of such an approach); United States v. 
Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mackinnon, J., concurring) (“Katz. 
23-Feb-17] MYTH OF CIRCULARITY 7 
determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists based on 
considerations extrinsic to Fourth Amendment doctrine, such as property 
law and popular expectations.  
But looking to public attitudes only escapes circularity if one believes 
that those attitudes won’t generally be driven by the doctrine itself. Within a 
year of Rakas, the Supreme Court would start worrying about the problem 
of feedback between what courts say and what the public expects. We will 
refer to this hypothesized feedback as attitudinal circularity, the idea that 
“understandings that are recognized … by society” will themselves be 
determined by legal pronouncements. If attitudinal circularity is a real 
concern then one of the solutions the Rakas Court offered for the problem 
of doctrinal circularity is no solution at all: the content of the doctrine 
would still depend on the content of the doctrine, just with the additional 
step of popular expectations being influenced by, and in turn influencing, 
doctrine. As the parade of scholars expressing concern over this kind of 
circularity indicates, there is an intuitive plausibility to the notion that the 
privacy expectations of reasonable people, those expectations to which Katz 
refers, are dependent on the pronouncements of courts.  
 
A.  The Development of Circularity Concern 
The Supreme Court’s first comments on attitudinal circularity appeared 
in Smith v. Maryland, which involved the government’s use of a pen 
register to determine what outgoing calls were being placed from a robbery 
suspect’s home.9 The Court in Smith applied the Katz framework yet, in the 
doing so, the majority made the following observation: 
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’ two-
pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of 
Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the 
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide 
television that all homes henceforth would be subject to 
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact 
entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their 
homes, papers, and effects. . . . In such circumstances, where 
an individual’s subjective expectations had been 
                                                                                                                            
… incorporates a fair amount of circularity. One will have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy over those areas that courts tell him he may reasonably 
expect to be private.”). See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTION: A 
UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 25 (2008). 
9 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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“conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth 
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations 
obviously play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.  
In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of 
privacy” existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be 
proper.10 
Here the Court is bringing attitudinal circularity to the forefront. The 
hypothetical example chosen by the Court posits that the government’s 
action (a frightening, Orwellian announcement that reaches millions of 
Americans) changes the attitudes of the citizenry. After the announcement, 
expectations of privacy have dissipated, and the government can invoke the 
(now) low privacy expectations of the citizenry if any lawyer tries to 
challenge the legality of the new policy in court. Such hypothetical (and 
unrealistic) circumstances could indeed create a logical problem for the 
doctrine.11 This hypothetical attacks the idea that popular attitudes are 
largely indifferent to state action, which seemed intuitive to the Court in 
Rakas. Therefore the clever Rakas remedy of looking at people’s beliefs no 
longer helps resolve matters. To deal with this attitudinal circularity 
problem the Court would need to ignore people’s actual attitudes and 
instead answer hard normative questions about what level of privacy people 
ought to expect.  
That said, it is worth underscoring that there are no documented 
instances of the federal government acting in a manner as brazen as what is 
described in the Smith hypothetical.12 There is presumably a first time for 
everything, but the Smith hypothetical would be unprecedented in this 
                                                 
10 Id. at 740 n.5. 
11 See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J.) 
(“imposing such a regime outright … can contribute to the downward ratchet of 
privacy expectations.”); United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (Katz “incorporates a fair amount of circularity. 
One will have a reasonable expectation of privacy over those areas that courts tell 
him he may reasonably expect to be private. Reference to another standard than 
plain view is also required.”). 
12 The initiation of mandatory baggage screening for airline passengers in January 
of 1973 is a somewhat close example, though at the time such screening began, 
regular air travel was a luxury out of reach for most Americans. See generally John 
Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combatting International Terrorism at 
United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL. L. 
REV. 501, 507 (1997) (discussing the history of baggage screening). 
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country. Setting it aside, popular expectations could easily be sufficiently 
impervious to changes in the law or police practices to allow the kinds of 
doctrinal uses referenced in Rakas. The proper empirical question is 
whether the kinds of governmental actions that we regularly see, such as 
new statutes or Supreme Court opinions, can meaningfully move attitudes. 
In its post-Smith pronouncements the Court has continued to refer to 
the Fourth Amendment’s circularity problem, but in terms that make it 
harder to determine whether the Court is referencing doctrinal circularity or 
attitudinal circularity. In the Court’s 2001 Kyllo opinion the majority 
observed that the “Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been 
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”13 
Subjectivity and unpredictability could be a problem associated with either 
doctrinal uncertainty (the judges get to declare the law is whatever the law 
they say it is) or attitudinal uncertainty (what the law is depends on how 
judges think people are reacting, an inquiry that is in and of itself subjective 
and hard to predict). More recently, Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Stevens 
have all opined on the Fourth Amendment’s circularity problem, 
referencing the issue in ways that sometimes hint that a particular form of 
circularity is on their mind and sometimes in more ambiguous terms.14  
                                                 
13 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)  
14 Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and complications 
noted above, but it is not without its own difficulties. It involves a degree of 
circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with 
those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In 
addition, the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable 
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology 
can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods 
in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant 
changes in popular attitudes.”) (citations omitted); Justice Kennedy, City of Los 
Angeles v Patel (Mar 3, 2015), Oral Argument Transcript, available at 2015 WL 
888287, at ∗13 (“If you prevail in this case and a member of the Court sits down to 
write the opinion, does he or she have to use the phrase “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” and say there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in our society, in 
our culture, in our day, or do we just forget that phrase? In -- in a way, as we all 
know it's circular, that if we say there is a reasonable expectation, then there is.”); 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 863 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Nor is 
it enough, in deciding whether someone's expectation of privacy is ‘legitimate,’ to 
rely on the existence of the offending condition or the individual's notice thereof. 
The Court's reasoning in this respect is entirely circular. The mere fact that a 
particular State refuses to acknowledge a parolee's privacy interest cannot mean 
10 Kugler & Strahilevitz [23-Feb-17 
More broadly, the Supreme Court has been all over the map in terms of 
its approach to the Fourth Amendment.15 In some of its decisions, the 
Court’s sense of popular expectations plays a significant or even decisive 
role, though invariably the Court is relying on justices’ educated guesses 
about public expectations rather than scientific data.16 In other cases, the 
Court essentially ignores these expectations or insists they are irrelevant.17 
The purported circularity of expectations of privacy may be one reason 
(among others) why the Court has never committed itself to a consistent 
methodology that is tied to popular understandings of Americans’ control 
over their persons, houses, papers, and effects.18  
 
B.  The Scholarly Consensus on Attitudinal Circularity 
Circularity has been a major point of discussion in Fourth Amendment 
scholarship, and we can identify a great many instances of well-regarded 
scholars articulating the attitudinal circularity. These scholars include 
Amitai Etzioni,19 Orin Kerr,20 Jed Rubenfeld,21 Dan Solove,22 Erwin 
                                                                                                                            
that a parolee in that State has no expectation of privacy that society is willing to 
recognize as legitimate—especially when the measure that invades privacy is both 
the subject of the Fourth Amendment challenge and a clear outlier. With only one 
or two arguable exceptions, neither the Federal Government nor any other State 
subjects parolees to searches of the kind to which petitioner was subjected. And the 
fact of notice hardly cures the circularity…” (citation omitted). 
15 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010), affirmed sub. 
nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504-08 (2007). 
16 Id. at 508-11 (discussing Supreme Court cases that follow what Kerr calls the 
“probabilistic model,” including Bond v. United States, Minnesota v. Olson, and 
California v. Ciraolo); see also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 757-
60 (2010) (using employees’ expectations, based on their understanding of the law, 
policies, and technologies, to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment).  
17 Id. at 511-12 (discussing Supreme Court cases that treat popular expectations as 
irrelevant, including Illinois v. Caballes, United States v. Miller, and United States 
v. Ross). 
18 See generally id. at 544 (noting that the Supreme Court is most likely to adhere 
to the probabilistic model of what government conduct constitutes a search when a 
group of strongly held “social norms that are difficult for the government to 
manipulate” and less likely to adhere to the model in other circumstances). 
19 Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE. W. L. REV. 413, 414-19 
(2014) (“It is difficult to comprehend why the well-established observation 
that Katz is tautological is not itself sufficient to lay Katz to rest.”). 
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Chemerinsky,23 David Sklansky,24 and Paul Schwartz,25 among many 
                                                                                                                            
20 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?” 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 512-13 (2001) (“By 
linking Fourth Amendment protection to the presence of extraconstitutional rights, 
the rights-based conception ensures that the government cannot use its mere ability 
to invade privacy [as in the Smith v. Maryland hypothetical] as a basis for 
eradicating Fourth Amendment protection.”). In subsequent scholarship, Kerr 
astutely noted that popular expectations cannot be completely determined by their 
response to government practices and court pronouncements. See Kerr, supra note 
15, at 511 n.34. Kerr described the degree of attitudinal circularity as “modest.” Id.  
21 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 132-33 (2008) ([T]he 
circularity problem … afflicts expectations-of-privacy analysis. An announcement 
that all telephone calls will henceforth be monitored deprives people of their 
reasonable expectations of privacy in such calls.”). 
22 Daniel Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1523–24 
(2010) (“Second, expectations of privacy depend in part on the law, so judicial 
decisions about reasonable expectations of privacy would have a bootstrapping 
effect. If the Supreme Court said there was or was not a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in something, then that pronouncement would affect people’s future 
expectations.”). 
23 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 643, 650 (2007) (“Moreover, the Fourth Amendment approach to protecting 
privacy based on whether there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” also poses 
serious problems. The government seemingly can deny privacy just by letting 
people know in advance not to expect any.”). 
24 David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy 
and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1072 n.8 (2014) (“The Court 
nicely illustrated the potential of the Katz test for circularity the following term 
when it upheld the routine collection of DNA samples from felony arrestees, 
reasoning in part that arrestees have reduced ‘expectations of privacy’--and citing 
for that proposition earlier decisions by the Court authorizing searches incident to 
arrest. ‘Reasonable expectations of privacy’ can be defined by social norms rather 
than legal rules, but the Katz test runs into a different kind of circularity: the 
tendency over time for people to become accustomed to governmental violations 
of privacy.”) (citations omitted). 
25 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public 
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 573 (1995) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court's search for reasonable expectations of privacy is tautological. The 
Fourth Amendment is held to be applicable in those circumstances in which people 
reasonably expect it to be applicable. Thus, when a desire for privacy is 
incommensurate with the general social view of reasonable privacy (or, more 
accurately, the Supreme Court's estimation of this view), Fourth Amendment 
protection does not exist. This amendment applies only when society already 
12 Kugler & Strahilevitz [23-Feb-17 
others.26 Now not all of these scholars are concerned about circularity to the 
same degree. Some are fairly skeptical, though even they feel they cannot 
rule out the circularity problem entirely.27 
At this point it is worth introducing a distinction between two possible 
versions of the attitudinal circularity hypothesis. The strong version states 
that a well-publicized Supreme Court decision (or unchallenged action by 
Congress or the Executive) will have the effect of swiftly changing privacy 
expectations. People will hear of the decision, word will spread through 
their social networks, and expectations will adjust accordingly. In contrast, 
the weak version of circularity instead states that such governmental actions 
will have the effect of changing privacy expectations only over a long 
period of time, perhaps decades, as the change in law filters down through 
police and popular culture.28 Put another way, the strong version circularity 
                                                                                                                            
awaits it.”). Schwartz goes on to emphasize feedback between technological 
development and popular expectations, a point later echoed by Paul Ohm. See infra 
note 26. 
26 See also Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of 
the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 536 (1977-1978) (“[T]he 
major inadequacy of exclusive reliance on the reasonably prudent man standard is 
that the standard merely reflects existing conditions without considering their 
desirability. The government can unilaterally change existing conditions and thus 
the expectations of reasonably prudent men.”); Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1392 (2007-2008) (“[The 
reasonable expectation test’s] circularity is especially problematic here at the onset 
of the Information Age …. If proponents of government surveillance can mold 
expectations to their advantage, they can have broad access to communications.”). 
Paul Ohm articulates a variation on the traditional attitudinal circularity account. 
Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1309, 1310-26 (2012) (“[T]he punch line is both easy to state and preordained 
almost to the point of being tautological--in a world without privacy, a Fourth 
Amendment built around reasonable expectations of privacy will no longer 
apply.”). Ohm emphasizes how popular expectations change in response to the use 
of new technologies more than case law developments, though which technologies 
get adopted is in part dependent on court rulings. 
27 Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-62 
(2001); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights 
of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (1987) 
28 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“We do not think 
there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded 
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our 
national culture.”). 
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involves people watching CNN, Fox, and The Daily Show and the weak 
version involves people watching Law and Order. 
Most scholars discussing the circularity hypothesis are not clear which 
version they are endorsing, and we do not want to put words in their 
mouths. But many of them have used the circularity critique to either 
suggest that the Katz test is incoherent,29 or to specifically criticize the 
incorporation of public expectations in Katz.30 Scholars such as Christopher 
Slobogin, Christine Scott-Hayward, and the two of us,31 have argued that 
the courts should regularly examine reliable survey evidence to determine 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists under Katz.32 If ordinary 
people’s expectations of privacy are determined mainly by what courts or 
the executive say the law is, or are basically indeterminate,33 then the social 
science survey approach has little to recommend it. In our view, public 
expectations should work as a corrective to outdated or obscure precedents 
and out of touch judges. If popular attitudes instead largely reflect the most 
recent actions of those same judges, looking to expectations gains society 
nothing while further muddling an already confused area of law.  
But circularity is only an effective critique of our position if one adopts 
a strong, or at least stronger, conception of it. If one assumes that public 
expectations only adapt over the span of decades, then there is no difficulty 
in running surveys to assess public attitudes; the attitudes would still be 
“real” and not the immediate product of the government action. It is only if 
the attitudes change quickly that the survey researchers would find the 
ground shifting under their feet. 
Testing the attitudinal circularity hypothesis therefore becomes an 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 650; Bacigal, supra note 26, at 536; 
Harper, supra note 26, at 1392; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 573. 
30 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 24, at 1072 n. 8; Solove, supra note 22, at 1523–
24. 
31 SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 13; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 205; 
Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 4, at 19; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 4, at 
727; Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic 
Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2014). 
32 See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the 
Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1852 (2016) (describing the 
“standard objections based on the circularity of the enterprise” in which survey 
approaches to Katz are engaged). 
33 Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951, 
964-65 (2009). 
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urgent project for the first principles of Fourth Amendment law. If ordinary 
peoples’ actual expectations of privacy are relatively stable and don’t 
depend on government pronouncements, then privileging those attitudes 
through doctrine may well be desirable. The case for turning to social 
expectations in Fourth Amendment law would look a lot like the case for 
examining social norms when trying to determine the content of property 
law34 or deferring to trade usages in contract litigation.35 Widespread shared 
beliefs probably (though not inevitably) reflect accumulated societal 
wisdom.36 And the more stable ordinary peoples’ expectations of privacy 
are, the more predictive and stable social science studies conducted at one 
point in time will be at a later date.37 Conversely, the more unstable, 
reactive, and random public attitudes are, the more reason to favor 
alternative theories that define the proper scope of the Fourth Amendment 
without any reference to popular expectations.38 Answering the empirical 
question of whether attitudes are circular then has a major impact on the 
normative question of whether we should (or even can) look to such 
attitudes when formulating doctrine. 
We therefore consider what actually happens when the Supreme Court 
issues a new decision on the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. When 
a particular decision is not widely-known, logically it is unlikely to 
immediately change society’s expectations of privacy.39 However some 
decisions receive widespread media coverage, and knowledge of a little-
known decision’s content conceivably could permeate the population over 
time. The extent to which this actually happens in Fourth Amendment cases 
is unclear. It is possible that these cases are just a flash in the pan, known to 
some people for an instant and then immediately forgotten, with only 
                                                 
34 Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (1881); Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 
1872); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
35 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2015).  
36 See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
(1790). 
37 See Kerr, supra note 33, at 964; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 234. 
38 See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 32, at 1830-33; Barry Friedman & Cynthia 
Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable: The Protections for Policing, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281 (2016); Kerr, supra note 15, at 503; Orin S. Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 
(2011); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment 
as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19 (1988). 
39 Abramowicz, supra note 27, at 61–62; Coombs, supra note 27, at 1596. 
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lawyers and law students remembering that they ever happened. It is also 
possible that they instead have long-term ripples that alter societal beliefs 
through news coverage, mass-media content, interactions with law 
enforcement, word-of-mouth, social media, and subtler mechanisms. 
 
C.  Social Sciences on Attitudinal Responses to Supreme Court 
Decisions 
Although a great deal of legal scholarship takes the notion of attitudinal 
circularity for granted, one of our frustrations in confronting the existing 
literature has been that it all ignores a large body of related political science 
research. For decades political scientists have been studying precisely how 
the public responds to major Supreme Court decisions. Yet legal scholars, 
as far as we know, haven’t previously made any connection between this 
literature and circularity. 
In reviewing the political science literature, it is helpful to consider the 
various (somewhat conflicting) findings through the lens of the 
psychological literature on persuasion. Two general theories are relevant 
here. The first is called motivated cognition. Imagine two people who 
strongly disagree about an issue, perhaps the death penalty. If pressed, these 
people would likely describe their views on the death penalty as stemming 
from different factual assumptions about how potential criminals respond to 
the existence of capital punishment, the number of mistaken convictions, 
the overall crime rate, and a variety of other questions. One might 
optimistically think that the level of disagreement would decline as these 
two people were exposed to new studies on the efficacy of capital 
punishment. Persuasion would not be total – no one gives up that easily – 
but the two sides should come closer together. This, sadly, does not happen. 
A classic study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper found that those exposed to 
information supporting their position become more extreme in their support 
while those exposed to information opposed to their position question the 
new data, moving far less than did those whose views were reinforced. 40 
The overall level of polarization actually increased due to this biased 
assimilation of information. 
Similar motivated cognition effects have been found time and time 
again, as people are shown to shape their assimilation and processing of 
new information to minimize the tension between it and their existing 
                                                 
40 Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 
37 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). 
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beliefs.41 This biased processing has been shown in interpretations 
information in a number of contexts, including video evidence.42 The 
relevance of motivated cognition to public reactions is quite 
straightforward: as in other contexts, we should expect people confronted 
by court decisions that run counter to their prior preferences and beliefs to 
resist those decisions rather than be immediately persuaded by them. 
The second relevant theory is the Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
persuasion (ELM). This model posits that the impact of a persuasive 
message will vary depending on the extent to which listeners are willing 
and able to process the message in depth. Listeners who are not motivated 
to think deeply about an issue will respond to “peripheral” characteristics – 
a liked or attractive source, for instance – whereas those who are motivated 
to think deeply about the issue will respond based more on “central” 
characteristics, such as the quality of the argument.43 Those who are 
motivated enough to attend to central characteristics often discount 
peripheral cues, meaning that the value of, say, a celebrity endorsement 
would be sharply limited to a highly attentive audience. Persuasion via the 
central route is more likely to lead to long-term attitude change whereas 
persuasion via the peripheral route is as superficial as the name suggests; it 
is short term and not especially predictive of behavior.44 
                                                 
41 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 
480 (1990). Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, & Stanley Schachter, WHEN 
PROPHECY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF A MODERN GROUP 
THAT PREDICTED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD (1956). 
42 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. 
ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a 
Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 851, 853 (2012) (replicating the effect in the context of video evidence). 
43 Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123 
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); Richard E. Petty & Daniel T. Wegener, The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current Status and Controversies, in DUAL 
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Shelly Chaiken & Yacov Trope 
eds., 1999). 
44 Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: 
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE, 21 (1986) (“Attitude 
changes that result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments (central route) 
will show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of behavior, and greater 
resistance to counter persuasion than attitude changes that result mostly from 
peripheral cues”). 
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One of the better predictors of the level of effort that a listener will put 
into processing a message is their degree of personal involvement and the 
strength of their initial attitude.45 Those who have a personal connection to 
an issue will attend to the message more. However, as suggested by the 
literature on motivated cognition, this will not necessarily lead to more 
accurate processing.46 Listeners could easily spend that additional 
processing power trying to counterargue against the persuasive message.  
Let’s keep these psychological principles in mind as we consider the 
political science literature. The modern era of political science 
investigations into the relationship between Supreme Court decisions and 
public opinion began with an empirical study by Robert Dahl, a giant figure 
in American political science.47 Dahl wrote in 1957 that although Congress 
usually got its way eventually in cases where the Supreme Court invalidated 
legislation, there were some cases where the Supreme Court had thwarted 
the will of Congress, either through lasting invalidation or substantial 
delay.48 In such cases, Dahl wrote that the Court had prevailed because it 
was an important agent of political leadership in the United States and had a 
basis for power – “the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of 
the Constitution.”49 Particularly where different branches of government 
were in conflict with one another and where it was adopting a solution that 
comported with “explicit or implicit norms held by the political leadership,” 
the Supreme Court could make national policy.50 This hypothesized 
persuasion is based on approval of the source, which is generally viewed as 
a peripheral cue in ELM terms. 
Dahl’s study used an analysis of governmental action to develop his 
                                                 
45 Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, & Rachel Goldman, Personal Involvement 
as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 847–
55 (1981) (showing that personal relevance increases attention to message quality 
and decreases the importance of peripheral cues).  
46 Id. But see Lauren C. Howe & Jon A. Krosnick, Attitude Strength, 68 ANNU. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 6.1, 6.10–11 (2017); Julia R. Zuwerink & Patricia G. Devine, 
Attitude Importance and Resistance to Persuasion: It's Not Just the Thought That 
Counts, 70 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 931–44 (1996) (both showing strong attitudes 
are more resistant to change). 
47 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
48 Id. at 291. 
49 Id. at 293. 
50 Id. at 294. 
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thesis but did not examine public opinion polling. Subsequent scholars set 
out to test his idea that the Supreme Court could influence national policy 
via what he called its “unique legitimacy.” Some of these scholars identified 
data that supported Dahl’s legitimacy theory. For example, Hanley, 
Salamone, and Wright found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Wade increased public support for abortion rights, at least in the short run.51 
An ingenious research paper by Katerina Linos and Kimberly Twist studied 
the effect of media coverage of Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
health care and immigration on popular opinion. They found that when 
respondents had been exposed (via television, radio, print reporting, and the 
like) to one-sided coverage of a salient decision that was supportive of what 
the Court had done, respondents’ views moved in a strongly pro-Court 
direction. This effect largely disappeared when individuals were exposed to 
more balanced coverage of the new decision that described its pros and 
cons, however.52 An impressive book by Valerie Hoekstra provided a more 
mixed picture. Hoekstra studied the localized public response in four 
communities where disputes that made their way to the Supreme Court 
arose.53 She found that the disputes garnered a lot of local press attention, 
and in two of the four cases there was a discernible if small shift in local 
sentiment towards the Court’s position after a Supreme Court decision.54 
But in the other two cases she studied, no such shift occurred.55 
As the political science research continued, many empirically oriented 
scholars collected data that did not match Dahl’s legitimacy thesis. Rather, 
what political scientists were finding in many cases was that after a major 
Supreme Court decision, some population groups fell in line with the 
Court’s decision and others strongly resisted it, consistent with a motivated 
cognition response. This data helped give rise to the structural response 
model, first articulated by Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki.56 According 
                                                 
51 John Hanley et al., Reviving the Schoolmaster: Reevaluating Public Opinion in 
the Wake of Roe v. Wade, 65 POL. RES. Q. 408, 416-18 (2012). 
52 Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public 
Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods, 45 J. LEGAL. 
STUD. 223 (2016).  
53 VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
(2003). 
54 Id. at 112-14. 
55 Id. 
56 Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, The U.S. Supreme Court, Public 
Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989). 
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to Franklin and Kosaki, salient Supreme Court cases are likely to persuade 
some groups of voters and spark a backlash among others. Where one 
observed no change in public sentiment after a major Supreme Court 
decision, it is possible that the decision itself and media reports about it 
didn’t change minds. But it is also possible that the decision changed a lot 
of minds, though the people who were pushed into support or opposition 
roughly cancelled each other out.57 Under this account, the public sentiment 
on a germane issue could become more polarized after a major Supreme 
Court decision than it was beforehand, again consistent with a motivated 
cognition response.58 Studies of popular reactions to decisions concerning 
homosexual sodomy seemed to have polarized opinion in this way. Both 
Bowers v. Hardwick59 (which upheld a criminal prohibition on sodomy) and 
Lawrence v. Texas60 (which struck it down) sparked a significant decline in 
popular support for same-sex relationships.61  
To be sure, support for same-sex relationships has risen very 
dramatically since Bowers, but each judicial opinion sparked a discernible 
negative reaction in popular sentiment, such that it took several years after 
Lawrence was decided for popular support for same sex relationships to 
reach the approval levels it garnered just before the decision.62 Indeed, 
Gallup polling data reveal that there have been only two periods since 1979 
in which a plurality of Americans said that “homosexual relations between 
consenting adults should not be legal”: 1986 to 1989 (right after Bowers) 
and 2003 (right after Lawrence).63 Demographic characteristics strongly 
predicted whether Americans were likely to rally around gay rights or reject 
them after the decisions.64 More recent work supports their findings, 
producing evidence of partisan polarization in the response to Burwell v. 
                                                 
57 Id. at 753-54, 767-68. 
58 Interestingly, the response to Roe loomed large for Franklin and Kosaki as well, 
even though they took very different implications from it than Hanley, Salamone, 
and Wright. Compare supra text accompanying note 51. 
59 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
60 539 U.S. 538 (2003). 
61 See James W. Stoutenborough et al., Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court 
Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419 (2006). 
62 Id. at 430. 
63 See Gallup, Gay and Lesbian Rights, available at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
64 Id. at 428-29. 
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Hobby Lobby,65 a 2014 Supreme Court decision.66 Follow-up work on the 
structural model produced more confounding findings, with mixed results 
concerning how the public responds when the Court issues several decisions 
about the same topic.67  
Finally, in recent years a new model has emerged to describe the 
popular reaction to prominent Supreme Court decisions. Joseph Ura’s 
thermostatic model posits that when the Supreme Court makes increasingly 
liberal decisions the populace will embrace decreasingly liberal policy 
views, and vice versa.68 The thermostatic model regards the American 
populace as interested in stability in the short run, such that they will pull 
back against decisions that seem to alter the status quo. Over the long run, 
though, the thermostatic model posits that the kind of legitimization effect 
that Dahl hypothesized does seem to occur. Ura describes his data as 
indicating “a complex interaction between the Supreme Court and the mass 
public characterized by short-term backlash against Supreme Court 
decisions in public mood followed by a long-run movement in public 
opinion toward the ideological position taken up by the Court.”69 Notably, 
the thermostatic model focuses on the aggregate effects of all the Supreme 
Court’s salient / high-profile decisions in a particular Term, rather than 
trying to isolate the effects of a single Supreme Court decision concerning 
abortion, the Second Amendment, the death penalty, or election law.70 
Having surveyed this rich literature, let’s examine what it might tell us 
– and what it might not tell us – about attitudinal circularity with regard to 
                                                 
65 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
66 Aziz Z. Huq & Avital Mentovich, The Polarizing Court (2015 unpublished 
manuscript). 
67 In cases where the Supreme Court rendered several decisions about a topic (as 
with abortion or the death penalty), some evidence suggests that only the Supreme 
Court’s first major decision on a topic seemed to generate a discernible impact on 
popular opinion. See Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s 
Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299, 
306 (1998). But other research examining the abortion data through a different lens 
failed to replicate that finding. Danette Brickman & David A.M. Peterson, Public 
Opinion Reaction to Repeated Events: Citizen Response to Multiple Supreme 
Court Abortion Decisions, 28 POL. BEHAV. 87 (2006). 
68 Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to 
Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 111-13 (2014). 
69 Id. at 118. 
70 Id. at 120. 
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the Katz test. First, the idea that the public will fall into line with the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about search and seizure law seems 
unlikely. In many of the political science papers, there was zero net impact 
on public attitudes, and in some cases the effect was actually negative. Also, 
most Fourth Amendment decisions are not particularly salient. They do not 
receive significant media coverage and, as a result, the overwhelming 
majority of citizens do not know they happened.71 As scholars in this area 
are quick to point out, the public knows little about what the Court does.72 It 
might strike a reader as surprising to think that the Court would have no 
effect as often as not: should it not matter that a relatively liked institution 
has endorsed a particular position? Well, yes, it should. But only if the 
public is aware of the endorsement and not so attentive to the issue to 
ignore the peripheral cue in favor of attention to the issue’s merits. And 
when persuasion occurs in that sweet spot of shallow processing it is likely 
to be particularly fragile.  
Second, even when a highly significant Supreme Court criminal 
procedure decision (like Katz, Miranda, or Jones) is announced, we should 
not be so quick to assume that the public will be persuaded by the Court’s 
moral judgment. That could happen under a legitimacy theory, and it could 
happen in the long run under the thermostatic theory. But the structural 
response model suggests that the public will become more polarized after 
the Court’s intervention, and will not collectively follow it. And here 
motivated cognition, which indicates that those opposed to a Court decision 
will counterargue against it, and the ELM, which posits that source 
characteristics are generally peripheral cues and unlikely to persuade those 
who are thinking deeply about an issue, both support the skepticism of the 
structural model. Finally, consistent with the thermostatic model we might 
expect to see a short run backlash against the Court’s judgment, suggesting 
the opposite of attitudinal circularity in the Fourth Amendment context.  
The collection of mixed effects just reviewed doesn’t even address the 
question of how well insights drawn from outside the Fourth Amendment 
will translate to the search and seizure context. Might some of the 
heterogeneity just reviewed be a function of the different issues studied, 
which ranged from abortion, to capital punishment, to gay rights, to purely 
local issues? It seems possible. 
                                                 
71 This phenomenon of citizen ignorance about important developments in 
government is hardly unique to the work of courts. See generally ILYA SOMIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (2d ed. 2016). 
72 See, e.g., HOEKSTRA, supra note 53, at 112-14. 
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In short, given the widespread belief in attitudinal circularity among 
Supreme Court justices and leading Fourth Amendment scholars, and given 
the political science literature that suggests some reasons to doubt the 
consensus in elite legal circles, there is an urgent need for empirical work to 
examine how the public updates its beliefs about the state of search and 
seizure law in response to a major change in the content of the law. We will 
describe our effort to fill that gap in Parts II and III. Our main goals for the 
study were threefold: to expand on the existing literature by measuring the 
impact of a Fourth Amendment decision, which had not previously been 
done, to track both the immediate and long-term effects of the decision, and 
to assess a range of privacy attitudes so we could determine exactly how 
public expectations shifted in the wake of the decision. 
II.) RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
Assessing attitudinal circularity requires information about privacy 
expectations before and after a major Supreme Court decision on the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment. Such decisions are uncommon, and major 
polling organizations do not regularly poll on privacy expectations, let alone 
poll with the level of specificity needed to measure the impact of a 
particular case.73 A golden opportunity to test the attitudinal circularity 
hypothesis arose in early 2012, when the Supreme Court United States v. 
Jones.74 That surprising and widely publicized decision substantially altered 
Fourth Amendment law, suggesting that the Constitution might protect 
information about a vehicle’s movements from one public place to another. 
But nobody thought to use precise polling to obtain a before and after 
snapshot of public attitudes on GPS tracking. Even if scholars had tried, the 
timing of the Jones decision was so unpredictable75 that there was a 
significant danger that the pre-Jones polling might occur several months 
before the Court’s decision, increasing the chances that some extrinsic 
factor explained any observed shifts in attitudes. We conceptualized the 
present project by bemoaning the missed opportunity in Jones and 
wondering whether lightning might strike a second time. 
The following year we realized there might be precisely such an 
opportunity in Riley v. California.76 Two consolidated Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local 
Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. OF POL., 1079, 
1083–84 (1996). 
74 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
75 The case was argued in early November and handed down in late January. 
76 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2481 (2014). 
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cases concerning police searches of cell phones were calendared for the last 
week of oral argument in the Supreme Court’s 2013 Term. And cases 
argued at the end of the Term are usually handed down at the end of the 
Term, so we could time our polling with much more precision than usual. 
We did not expect that Riley would be nearly as big of a deal as it turned out 
to be, but there was a chance of something major happening in Fourth 
Amendment law so we figured paying for two nationally representative 
samples was a worthwhile gamble.  
David Riley’s case involved the recovery of pictures from his smart 
phone, and the consolidated case of Brima Wurie involved the recovery of 
an address from a flip phone’s contact list. Existing case law had been read 
to allow warrantless searches of physical containers in the arrestees’ 
possession, like purses, wallets, and briefcases, incident to arrest.77 So an 
arrested person could expect a warrantless search of any personal papers 
they were carrying, including address books and the like. A literal-minded 
application of precedent would have applied the same rule to cell phones: 
why should it matter whether the seized address book was physical or 
electronic? As Judge Posner observed not long before Riley, “[i]t’s not even 
clear that we need a rule of law specific to cell phones or other computers. 
If police are entitled to open a pocket diary to copy the owner’s address, 
they should be entitled to turn on a cell phone to learn its number.”78 Before 
Riley, the federal appellate courts frequently upheld warrantless searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest.79 Writing on SCOTUSBlog before oral 
argument, Lyle Denniston anticipated that the Court would be “cautious” 
perhaps deciding “these cases narrowly,” in a manner that treated smart 
phones and flip phones differently.80 A few days later, summarizing oral 
                                                 
77 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (contents of a cigarette 
pack); United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(billfold and address book); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1383–1384 
(11th Cir 1982) (wallet); United States v. Lee, 501 F.2d 890, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(purse). 
78 United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2012). 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711-13 (5th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Murphy, 
552 F.3d 405, 411-12 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809-10 
(permitting a limited cell phone search incident to arrest, while reserving the 
question of whether a more invasive search would have been permissible without a 
warrant).  
80 Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Police and Cell Phone Privacy, 
SCOTUSBlog, April 25, 2014, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/
argument-preview-police-and-cellphone-privacy/ (visited Dec. 14, 2016). 
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arguments in the two cases, Denniston seemed certain of little except his 
“strong impression that the Justices would stay away from flat rules: either 
that police can always search any such device that they take from an 
arrested person, or that they could not search its contents at all.”81 We think 
the average citizen knew essentially nothing about the cases before they 
were decided, and the lawyers that were following them do not appear to 
have expected a sea change in the law. 
Despite these modest expectations, Riley charted a new course. The 
Court likened the argument that cell phones were “materially 
indistinguishable” from briefcases to “saying a ride on horseback is 
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of 
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them 
together.”82 Cell phones simply contain too much information to treat them 
like physical papers. So the Court fashioned a bright line rule, albeit with a 
caveat that police could dispense with the need for a warrant in standard-ish 
“exigent circumstances.” As the Chief Justice concluded his opinion: “Our 
answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone 
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”83 
Most surprisingly, the Court’s ruling against the government was 
unanimous,84 and Chief Justice Roberts’ decision received prominent and 
generally celebratory media coverage in the days following the ruling. 
Political scientists observe that the existence of dissents in prominent 
Supreme Court cases tends to draw significant media attention, resulting in 
an increased likelihood of a polarized public response to a ruling by the 
Court.85 But when the public reads one-sided, positive coverage of an 
opinion, they are likely to be persuaded by what the Court had done.86 So 
                                                 
81 Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Limiting a Search? Sure, But How?, 
SCOTUSBlog, April 29, 2014, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/
argument-analysis-limiting-a-search-sure-but-how/ (visited Dec. 14, 2016). 
82 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2488. 
83 Id. at 2494. 
84 See Adam Gershowitz, Surprising Unanimity, Even More Surprising Clarity, 
SCOTUSBlog, June 26, 2014, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/
symposium-surprising-unanimity-even-more-surprising-clarity/ (visited Dec. 14, 
2016) (describing the Court’s surprising unanimity, its decision to opt for a bright 
line rule instead of a standard, and its refusal to compromise based on the type of 
phone and digital information at issue). 
85 Stoutenborough et al., supra note 61, at 425. 
86 See supra text accompanying note 52. 
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the unanimity of Riley amplified the “treatment dosage” in terms of judicial 
influence on public beliefs.  
Riley figured prominently in the nightly news broadcast for the major 
networks on the evening of the decision, with NBC and CBS making it their 
lead story and ABC discussing it as their second story of the night.87 Stories 
about Riley were front page news in most of the nation’s largest circulation 
newspapers as well,88 another factor that political scientists view as 
meaningful in determining whether a case can be described as sufficiently 
salient to capture public attention.89 The Los Angeles Times called Riley the 
Supreme Court’s “most sweeping and surprising criminal-law opinion in 
years.”90 The Washington Post emphasized the surprising nature of the 
decision, especially given the uncertainty apparent when the case was 
argued: "During oral arguments, the justices seemed divided over the issue. 
But they united behind soaring language from Roberts about privacy 
                                                 
87 See Transcript, ABC World News with Diane Sawyer, June 25, 2014, available 
at 2014 WLNR 17743541 (Riley was the second story reported, with the Court 
calling it a “landmark ruling” and a commentator calling it “probably the most 
important privacy ruling in the digital age”); Transcript, CBS Evening News, June 
25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 17458527 (Riley was the first story reported, 
with anchor Scott Pelley noting that “the Supreme Court justices spoke with one 
voice today,” and CBS News Correspondent Jan Crawford calling it “a major 
victory for privacy rights in the modern digital era”); Transcript, NBC Nightly 
News, June 25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 17465369 (Riley was the first story 
reported, with anchor Brian Williams calling it “a big victory for personal privacy” 
and commentator Tom Goldstein saying, “It was almost a shock, the breadth with 
which the justices were willing to protect private information that's on computers 
and cell phones on the internet.”). 
88 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Limit Phone Searches, WASHINGTON POST, 
June 26, 2014, at A1; Jess Bravin, Supreme Court: Police Need Warrants to 
Search Cellphone Data: Unanimous Supreme Court Says Privacy Outweighs 
Police Convenience, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2014, at A1; Adam Liptak, Major 
Ruling Shields Privacy of Cell Phones: Supreme Court Says Phones Can’t Be 
Searched Without Warrant, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2014, at A1; David G. Savage, 
Court Limits Phone Searches, CHI. TRIB. June 26, 2014, at 1. The story did not 
make front page news in USA Today. See Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Limits 
Phone Searches: Cell Phones More Private than Other Searchable Objects, USA 
TODAY, June 26, 2014, at 2A. 
89 Brickman & Peterson, supra note 67, at 97. 
90 David G. Savage, Court Deems Phones Private: In a Major Ruling, Justices Say 
Police Cannot Search the Digital Devices without a Warrant, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 
2014, at 1. 
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concerns in the digital era…”91 The New York Times described the case as a 
“sweeping victory for privacy rights in the digital age,” and prominently 
quoted Orin Kerr’s assessment that the Court had thrust the Fourth 
Amendment into “a new digital age. You can’t apply the old rules 
anymore.”92 The Wall Street Journal called Riley “a watershed, showing 
that all nine justices are keen to re-examine categorical rules written for an 
earlier era.”93  
Riley therefore represented an unambiguous change in law.94 As Kerr 
observed immediately in the wake of the decision “Riley can be fairly read 
as saying that computers are a game-changer.”95 This conclusion had 
implications for a variety of parts of Fourth Amendment law, ranging from 
warrant specificity, to searches at the national border, to long-term 
electronic monitoring in public places.96 Paul Ohm described Riley as a 
“significant milestone in constitutional criminal procedure,” and a “privacy 
opinion for the ages.”97 He added that “Riley v. California is not the only 
recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court embracing a new vision of 
the Fourth Amendment in a technological age, but it is the most 
important.”98 Whatever the merits of the Riley opinion, from a social 
                                                 
91 Barnes, supra note 88, at A1. 
92 Liptak, supra note 88, at A1. 
93 Bravin, supra note 88, at A1. 
94 Courts in recent years have held that evidence gathered from pre-Riley searches 
of cell phones incident to arrest admissible under the Fourth Amendment’s good 
faith exception, meaning that before Riley officers were well within their rights to 
believe they had the authority to search a cell phone incident to an arrest. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 708-10 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Eccleston, 615 Fed. Appx. 767 (4th Cir. 2015). 
95 Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley, The Volokh Conspiracy, (June 25, 2014). 
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/
06/25/the-significance-of-riley 
96 See, e.g., Charles A Taylor, Fiction of Privacy under the Fourth Amendment: 
Examining Warrantless Cell Phone Searches in the Context of Riley v. California, 
42 N. KY. L. REV. 395 (2015); Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The 
Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter 
Data, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1140 (2015); Kugler, supra note 31; Kugler & Strahilevitz, 
supra note 3. 
97 Paul Ohm, The Life of Riley (v. California), 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 133-34 
(2015). 
98 Id. at 141-42. 
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science perspective its unanimity, clarity, and the media’s reaction to it 
made it a nearly ideal vehicle for studying the public response to Supreme 
Court decisions. As evidently the only empirical researchers studying the 
effects of Riley on popular beliefs in real time, we had gotten a very lucky 
break. 
III.) AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF CIRCULARITY 
Because Riley was argued so late in the term, it was possible to 
approximate when the decision would issue with relatively high certainty. 
This allowed us to schedule the first two waves of our four-wave survey to 
closely bracket the decision. The first wave was administered June 11 – 13, 
2014, and Riley was handed down on June 25, 2014. Wave II was 
administered July 1 – 2, 2014, one week after the decision, to measure its 
immediate impact. To measure the longer-term effect, we conducted Wave 
III a year after that, May 26 – June 2, 2015, and Wave IV a year after that, 
July 21 – August 4, 2016. 
For each wave, a weighted sample of adult American citizens was 
recruited by Toluna, a professional survey firm with an established panel. 
The exact demographics of each wave are reported in the Appendix. 
Though there are some other minor variations in representation across 
waves, there were no substantial shifts on age, sex, race, or ethnicity, and all 
were controlled for in the main analysis. 
A.  Main Dependent Measure 
Since the Riley decision changed the treatment of cell phone searches 
incident to arrest, the primary study measure assessed privacy expectations 
in that context. Participants were randomly assigned to imagine that a 
person was being arrested for either possession of cocaine or attempted 
murder. We used the two different crimes so that we could be more 
confident that our results were not idiosyncratic to crime type. As discussed 
below, crime type had no impact on our change over time story. 
Participants were asked two types of questions about a variety of 
possible searches, each question intended to tap a slightly different 
perspective. One asked “[w]ould the arrestee (i.e., the person being arrested) 
reasonably expect that police will [conduct a particular search]?” and the 
other asked “[u]nder the Constitution, can the police do this to the arrestee 
without first getting a search warrant?” The first question was answered on 
5 point scales ranging from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely Yes.” The 
“reasonably expect” question places greater emphasis on what is likely to 
happen, while the “warrant” question instead emphasizes what the 
participant believes the Constitution requires. As part of a previous project, 
we experimented with a variety of different ways of asking about 
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expectations of privacy. For example, we asked whether a search violated 
people “privacy,” “expectations of privacy,” or “reasonable expectations of 
privacy,” as well as altering whether the question asked about “people’s” 
privacy or “your” privacy.99 Though using a first-person framing produced 
slightly higher privacy expectations overall, we found no other differences. 
Here we opted for a third person framing because we thought it odd to ask 
participants to imagine themselves being arrested for attempted murder. 
The searches the participants were asked to consider were split into 
eight physical searches and eight cellphone searches. The particular 
searches were selected to represent a range of intrusiveness to allow for 
variance in responses. The physical searches included items such as “search 
his car for any packages he might be carrying and open the packages” and 
“perform a body cavity search.” The electronic searches included “search 
the phone for a list of most recent calls” and “use the phone to open his 
Facebook app and read his newsfeed and messages.” The text for all 
searches is included in the Appendix. Since the change in law was specific 
to cell phones and cell phone searches were explicitly differentiated from 
physical searches, the physical search questions served as a control. 
To simplify the analysis, composite variables were created for both the 
physical and electronic searches by averaging the responses to each of the 
eight scenarios. As a result there were composite “expectation” scores, 
which ranged from 1 to 5 with higher numbers indicating a greater 
expectation of privacy, and composite “warrant” scores, which ranged from 
0 to 1 and indicated the percentage of the eight scenarios for which warrants 
were believed to be required.100 Greater “expectations of privacy” are 
therefore indicated by higher “expectation” scores and higher “warrant” 
scores. 
An ANCOVA101 was conducted on these measures that controlled for a 
variety of demographic variables to account for the minor cross-sample 
variations, and we treated participant wave and attributed crime condition 
                                                 
99 Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 248 n 170. 
100 All four composites were highly reliable. Expectation-Electronic α = .96, 
Warrant-Electronic α = .95, Expectation-Physical α = .85, Warrant-Electronic α = 
.80. In the survey itself, higher scores on the expectation measure indicated greater 
expectation of searches, but the coding was flipped for analysis to ease 
interpretation. 
101 Analysis of Covariance. This compares means across conditions while 
controlling for (holding constant) other factors as in regression. Given the same 
inputs, an ANCOVA and a multiple regression are statistically interchangeable.  
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(cocaine or attempted murder) as independent factors.102 Though there were 
main effects of attributed crime on the electronic and physical expectation 
measures, this factor did not have a significant effect on the warrant 
measure and did not interact significantly with wave for either measure.103 
More importantly, there were significant differences across waves on both 
of the electronic search dependent measures (expectation and warrant). As 
shown in Table 1, both of the measures shifted in a pro-privacy direction 
between Waves I (two weeks before) and II (one week after) and then 
shifted back to baseline for Wave III (one year after) and IV (two years 
after). The two physical search dependent measures did not differ 
significantly across waves.104 
                                                 
102 Specifically, the ANCOVA controlled for sex, age, Black or SE Asian race, 
Hispanic ethnicity, and educational attainment. These were selected ex ante but the 
results were robust to a variety of possible other arrangements, including raw 
(unadjusted) means. Presented dependent variable means are estimated for the 
mean scores on each of the controls. 
103 There was a significant main effect on the electronic F(1, 4112) = 44.63, p < 
.001 and physical F(1, 4112) = 31.92, p < .001 expectation measures, but not on 
either warrant measure (Fs < 1). This may indicate that some participants were 
reading expectation as a matter of what police would bother to do while reading 
the warrant question as covering what the police were legally allowed to do. It was 
to deal with this type of interpretative ambiguity that we asked both questions. 
104 This could also have been analyzed as a mixed ANCOVA with physical versus 
electronic search as a within subject factor. When this analysis is conducted, there 
is a significant interaction between search type and wave, supporting the story 
presented here. 
30 Kugler & Strahilevitz [23-Feb-17 
Table 1: Adjusted means on primary dependent measures  
  Wave I:   
Premeasure 
N = 700 
Wave II:   
One Week 
N = 751 
Wave III:   
One Year 
N = 1399 
Wave IV:   
Two Years 
N = 1294 df F η2 N105 
Electronic 
Search 
Expectation 2.79 a (.05) 3.00 b (.05) 2.74 a (.04) 2.78 a (.04) 3, 4118 5.96 *** .004 4132 
Warrant 0.66 a (.02) 0.72 b (.01) 0.66 a (.01) 0.65 a (.01) 3, 4118 4.80 ** .003   
Physical 
Search 
Expectation 2.31   (.04) 2.41   (.04) 2.34   (.03) 2.40   (.03) 3, 4118 1.83   .001   
Warrant 0.48   (.01) 0.50   (.01) 0.47   (.01) 0.48   (.01) 3, 4118 1.72   .001   
GPS 
Tracking  
Composite 3.53   (.05) 3.54   (.05) 3.56   (.08) 3.50   (.04) 3, 3075 .29   .000 3089 
Other REP Webcam 4.03 a (.05) 4.02 a (.05) 3.87 b (.06) 3.75 b (.06) 3, 2782 5.94 *** .006 2796 
Facial Rec 2.67 a (.06) 2.69 a (.06) 2.56 ab (.06) 2.47 b (.06) 3, 2782 2.94 * .003   
Park Camera 2.58   (.06) 2.56   (.06) 2.41   (.06) 2.48   (.06) 3, 2782 1.83   .002   
Stingray 3.16   (.06) 3.11   (.05) 3.18   (.06) 3.14   (.06) 3, 2782 .34   .000   
ISP Emails        3.26 a (.06) 2.96 b (.06) 3.07 b (.06) 2, 2084 7.44 *** .007 2096 
Cell Site        2.88   (.06) 2.88   (.06) 2.87   (.06) 2, 2084 .02   .000   
Hotel 
Registry 
            2.92   (.04) 2.93   (.04) 1, 2673 .05   .000 2683 
Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). If a measure differs significantly across 
condition, scores on that measure that do not share a subscript are significantly different 
from each other.  
 
The difference between Waves I and II on the electronic measures 
somewhat supported the circularity critique: immediately in the wake of a 
relevant Supreme Court decision, people appear to be updating their 
expectations on both measures to match the new guiding law. And this is 
not a general change in privacy expectations but rather a change targeted to 
the content of the decision; expectations regarding physical searches did not 
change significantly. What follows Wave II undermines the circularity 
                                                 
105 The reader might be wondering why the number of participants varies so much 
across question. Though the main Riley questions were identical across all waves, 
variants were introduced for some of the other questions. A large number of 
participants in Wave III received different versions of the GPS monitoring 
questions, and from Wave III on there were two variants of the “Other REP” 
questions, an original and an “author’s preferred” version that removed language 
we believed was biasing. Since the subject of interest in this Article is changes 
over time, only results from the versions of the questions used in Wave I were 
analyzed. Results from Wave III of the “author’s preferred” version are reported in 
Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 260. 
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critique, however: expectations returned to their baseline a year after the 
decision and they remained there the following year. The best interpretation 
of this data are that the effect of Riley on public attitudes was small – the 
effect sizes are quite modest – and that even this small effect is likely short-
lived. 
This data are displayed in Figure 1. Note that while the physical search 
expectation and warrant measures (the two lower lines) are flat across wave, 
the electronic measures (the two higher lines) both move significantly in the 
two-week post-decision wave and then return to their starting levels in the 
third wave. 
Figure 1: Changes in Expectations and Perceived Warrant Requirements 
Across Waves. 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
B.  Comparison Dependent Measures 
Many commentators considering the Riley decision speculated that it 
would have a major impact on other areas of Fourth Amendment law. As 
noted above, the general question of whether “computers are different” 
appears in a number of different guises, and Riley itself can be read as 
having serious implications for the mosaic theory, which, if adopted, would 
substantially rewrite a number of key precedents.106 We therefore asked 
                                                 
106 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012) (“Under the mosaic theory, searches can be 
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about a number of other searches to see whether expectations regarding 
them were impacted by the Riley decision. These questions were of the form 
used in our prior research, asking “Would it violate people's reasonable 
expectations of privacy if law enforcement [performed various searches]” 
with the possible responses ranging from 1 – Definitely Not to 5 – 
Definitely Yes. Again, higher numbers indicate greater expectations of 
privacy. The wording of the particular questions is given in the Appendix. 
The cross wave comparison on these questions used the same controls as 
the ANCOVA reported on the main measures, though it omitted the crime-
type factor as it was not relevant (only the arrest questions referred to it).107  
If there is substantial feedback between judicial decisions and public 
expectations then expectations on some of these questions should also 
change, and the change should fit the pattern of increasing privacy 
expectations immediately after the Riley decision that persist or perhaps 
even strengthen over time. This is not observed on any measure. One set of 
these questions, discussed in our prior paper on the mosaic theory, asked 
about tracking a person’s car on public streets using its onboard GPS 
system for various lengths of time (an instant, a day, a week, and a 
month).108 The mean response to these questions did not differ significantly 
across waves even though this issue arguably also reduces to “quantity 
makes it different” and “electronic surveillance is different,” the exact 
issues highlighted by Justice Roberts in Riley. Likewise the use of data from 
a camera in the public park was not viewed differently across waves. 
The only searches that are viewed differently across time periods are 
the remote activation of a laptop’s webcam, the use of facial recognition 
technology at a public sporting event, and obtaining a person’s emails from 
                                                                                                                            
analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual 
steps. Identifying Fourth Amendment searches requires analyzing police actions 
over time as a collective ‘mosaic’ of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a 
collective Fourth Amendment search even though the individual steps taken in 
isolation do not.”).  
107 As we indicated in supra note 105, we changed how we asked these questions 
during the research program. The original wordings for some of these items 
described the people searched as criminal “suspects,” which has the impact of 
significantly deflating privacy expectations because it is more reasonable to search 
someone who is suspected of a crime. For consistency, Table 1 reports responses 
only from the participants in each wave who received the “old” versions of the 
questions. Responses to the “new” versions are available in our prior paper. Kugler 
& Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 258–60.  
108 Id. 
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their ISP. The shifts in these attitudes, however, are in the wrong direction 
entirely; privacy expectations are reduced in Waves III and IV. Also the 
changes in these attitudes did not come in Wave II, as they should have if 
Riley were the cause. 
One of the searches employed in Waves III and IV asked participants 
whether it would violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy if 
police: 
Searched a hotel’s guest register to obtain the names, 
home addresses, and assigned hotel room numbers of the 
guests who stayed there on a particular night?  
This search was inspired by Los Angeles v. Patel,109 which presented a 
facial challenge to a California statute requiring hotel operators to keep such 
records and open them to police inspection upon request. Patel was the only 
major Fourth Amendment search case decided by the Supreme Court during 
the 2014 Term. On June 22, 2015, the Court held 5–4 that the statute was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Both Justice Sotomayor’s majority 
opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent focused on the administrative search 
exception and whether hotels were a sufficiently regulated industry that 
they could be made to turn over records without having the option of 
precompliance review. Justice Sotomayor described the hotel operator’s 
privacy expectations in terms of how dangerous their industry was 
compared to those previously labeled as closely regulated.110 Justice Scalia 
instead would have the question turn on “the expectations of those who 
enter such a line of work,”111 and specifically whether hotel operators 
understood their business to be so regulated that book inspections were par 
for the course. But neither would have made the question turn on the 
privacy expectations of hotel guests. 
The case was pending at the time we ran Wave III and we timed that 
wave so that the case would be likely to come down shortly after the wave 
was completed. Because public privacy expectations were not at stake in 
Patel the way they were in Riley and the decision as written did not 
emphasize them, we did not run the same kind of post-decision survey that 
year. Wave IV, however, can still serve as a one year out comparison. As 
with Riley, one year after the Patel decision privacy expectations were the 
same as they were on the predecision baseline; the two numbers are 
                                                 
109 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015). 
110 135 S. Ct. at 2454 (Sotomayor). 
111 135 S. Ct. at 2461 (Scalia, dissenting). 
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virtually identical (see Table 1). If there was an initial effect of the decision, 
it was gone by that time. 
The Patel decision would not have been the best candidate for Fourth 
Amendment circularity, and we do not want to over-interpret reactions to 
this fairly insignificant case. The issue got much less coverage than Riley’s 
and the impact on the public’s privacy was one-step removed. But to the 
extent that one can draw conclusions, the Patel pattern supports the Riley 
story: if the Supreme Court had any effect on public privacy expectations, 
that effect was gone within a year. 
C.  Knowledge of the Riley Decision 
It was expected that those who had heard of the Riley decision and 
could explicitly remember it would have different reactions than those who 
had not and could not. Therefore at the end of the Riley portion of the 
survey, participants were asked:  
On June 25, 2014, the US Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Riley v. California. The Court decided whether a 
warrant was required before the police could search the cell 
phone of someone they had just arrested. Had you heard about 
the Supreme Court's decision in that case prior to this survey? 
As shown in Table 2, 40% of the sample in Wave II reported having heard 
of the decision, as did 20% in Wave III and 22% in Wave IV. These 
numbers seem somewhat high based on previous work on awareness of 
Supreme Court decisions, so there may be some false positive reports. Even 
major Supreme Court cases often achieve only modest fame,112 though 
awareness is often higher in the immediate wake of decisions.113 If the 40% 
figure is to be believed, it would be on level with national knowledge in the 
wake of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.114 As we noted above, however, 
Riley was something of a Fourth Amendment superstar and received an 
impressive amount of media coverage, so the figure may not be as 
                                                 
112 C-SPAN, Landmark Cases: Which Supreme Court rulings are Americans 
familiar with? (Oct. 1, 2015) (available at http://static.c-span.org/files/pressCenter/
Landmark_Cases_Poll_Release_Oct_1_2015REV.pdf). 
113 Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AMER. 
POL. SCI. REV 89, 92–32 (2000). Charles Franklin, Liane C. Kosaki, & Herbert 
Kritzer, The Salience of United States Supreme Court Decisions," unpublished 
manuscript, *16 (1993) (available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/research/
opinion/spsa1992.pdf) (noting a month long uptick in awareness). 
114 HOKESTRA, supra note 53, at 73–75. 
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outlandish as the Casey comparison makes it appear.115 Those who had 
heard about Riley generally said they had first heard about the decision from 
television coverage (47.5%), with the next most frequently attributed source 
being internet news sites and blogs (16.7%). In any event, it is noteworthy, 
though not surprising, that the number of the respondents who claimed to 
have known about a decision declined by half within a year. 
To assess the impact of this self-reported knowledge, an ANCOVA was 
conducted that used a variable that combined wave with whether the 
participant reported having heard of Riley as its primary predictor. The 
ANCOVA otherwise employed the same controls as in the main analysis. 
There were thus seven groups (one for Wave I and two for each of the other 
waves, one group reporting knowledge and the other not). There were 
significant differences across these groups on both of the electronic 
measures but on neither of the physical measures.116 Post hoc analyses 
revealed that there was a significant difference in Wave II between those 
who reported having heard of the Riley decision and those who had not. As 
can be seen in Table 2, those in Wave II who had heard of the Riley 
decision had significantly stronger privacy expectations than those who did 
not, and there was no difference between people in Wave I (who could not 
have heard of a decision that hadn’t happened yet) and those in Wave II 
who said they had not heard of Riley. So the increase in privacy 
expectations observed in Wave II is being driven entirely be those who 
claim to have heard of the decision.  
 
                                                 
115 See Part II. 
116 Electronic Expectation, F(6, 4112) = 4.85, p < .001 η2 = .007; Electronic 
Warrant, F(6, 4112) = 4.74, p < .001 η2 = .007; Physical Expectation, F(6, 4112) = 
2.06, ns η2 = .003; Physical Warrant, F(6, 4112) = 1.32, ns η2 = .002. 
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Table 2 Adjusted means on primary dependent measures as a function of 
self-reported Riley knowledge. 
 
  
Wave I: 
Premeasure Wave II: One Week Wave III: One Year Wave IV: Two Years 
 
Know Riley NA No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Electronic 
Search 
Expectation 2.79 bc (.05) 2.88 b (.07) 3.19 a (.08) 2.78 bc (.04) 2.64 c (.08) 2.79 bc (.04) 2.75 bc (.08) 
Warrant 0.66 bc (.02) 0.68 c (.02) 0.77 a (.02) 0.67 b (.01) 0.63 bc (.02) 0.67 bc (.01) 0.62 c (.02) 
Physical 
Search 
Expectation 2.31  (.04) 2.46  (.05) 2.35  (.06) 2.37  (.03) 2.26  (.06) 2.43  (.03) 2.33  (.06) 
Warrant 0.48   (.01) 0.50   (.01) 0.49   (.02) 0.47   (.01) 0.46   (.02) 0.48   (.01) 0.45   (.02) 
Percent Knowing of 
Riley 
NA 40.29  21.09 22.41 
Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). If a measure differs significantly across 
condition, scores on that measure that do not share a subscript are significantly different 
from each other. 
 
In Waves III and IV, there were no significant differences on these 
privacy measures between those who claimed to have heard of Riley and 
those who did not. The nonsignificant differences in those waves are 
actually in the wrong direction, with those claiming to have heard of Riley 
having lower privacy expectations and less protective beliefs about warrant 
requirements than others. So in addition to fewer people in Waves III and 
IV claiming to have heard of Riley, this claim seems to mean something 
different in those waves than it did in Wave II.  
The change over time data are also depicted in Figure 2. Note here that 
the “Don’t Know” lines are flat across waves whereas the “Know” lines 
show changes in Wave II but then return to baseline in Wave III. 117   
                                                 
117 Since participants could not know of Riley before the decision was issued, the 
overall data are used for both the “Know” and “Don’t Know” lives in Wave I. 
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Figure 2: Changes in Expectations and Warrant Requirements 
Depending on Whether the Participants Knew of Riley. 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Results on another measure support the interpretation that knowledge 
of the decision has a different meaning in the later waves. In each wave, 
participants were asked four questions assessing their knowledge of the 
Supreme Court. For example, participants were asked to identify the Chief 
Justice and state how many Justices currently sit on the Court.118 From 
these four questions a scale was created ranging between 0 and 1 that 
reflected the proportion of questions each participant had gotten correct. 
Scores on this measure across the later three waves were analyzed in a 3 
(wave) by 2 (knowledge of Riley) ANOVA. Results showed a significant 
interaction between knowledge of Riley and wave.119 Though those 
claiming to know about Riley did better on the knowledge test in each wave, 
this difference was largest in the second wave, indicating that the difference 
in claimed knowledge had the most meaning at that time point.120 Since 
                                                 
118 All questions given in the Appendix. Note that the number of Justices question 
was artificially difficult in Wave IV because the correct answer had changed 
following Justice Scalia’s death. 
119 F(2, 3419) = 3.25, p < .05 η2 = .002. 
120 Wave II F(1, 748) = 25.79, p < .001 η2 = .033, Mknow = .60, SD = .31; MNot = 
.48, SD = .33. 
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those who said they knew of Riley objectively did know more about the 
Court, this gives us increased confidence that a meaningful number of 
participants were reporting their knowledge accurately, particularly in Wave 
II.  
D.  Informing about Riley 
At the close of the experiment, after all the other data had been 
collected, we told people about the Riley decision’s holding and then 
readministered the main electronic search dependent measures. The text of 
this disclosure is in the Appendix. Participants in Waves II through IV 
therefore responded to the electronic expectation and warrant questions 
twice: at the start of the study, before they were told of the decision, and at 
the close of the study, after they had been. This design was, in our view, 
likely to provoke a kind of demand characteristic: having just been given 
arguably relevant information about their privacy expectations by the 
survey itself, we could reasonably expect that participants would echo that 
information back to us.121 We thought, however, that these data could 
present a useful point of comparison. 
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on these electronic expectation and 
warrant questions that employed crime type, wave, and prior knowledge of 
the Riley decision as between subject factors and the timing of the 
questions, whether they were before or after having been told of the Riley 
decision’s holding, as a within subject factor.122 There were significant 
differences between the expectation and warrant data gathered at the start of 
the study and that gathered after the participants had been informed of the 
                                                                                                                            
Wave III F(1, 1390) = 3.82, p = .05 η2 = .003, Mknow = .48, SD = .35; MNot = 
.44, SD = .31. 
Wave IV F(1, 1289) = 12.25, p < .001 η2 = .009, Mknow = .45, SD = .32; MNot = 
.38, SD = .30. 
121 The experimental approach has been used previously by political scientists. See, 
e.g., Patrick J. Egan & Jack Citrin, The Limits of Judicial Persuasion, and the 
Fragility of Judicial Legitimacy, 2011 Working Paper, available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gh262w3 (visited Dec. 15, 2016). See generally 
Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (1989) (describing the general norms of 
conversation, such that listeners will generally assume that information they are 
presented with is relevant to the ongoing conversation and is informative). Austin 
L. Nichols & Jon K. Maner, The Good Subject Effect: Investigating Participant 
Demand Characteristics, 135 J. GEN. PSYCH. 151-165 (2008). 
122 The usual effects of wave, crime type, and the interaction between wave and 
prior knowledge of Riley were again observed, but they were simply as reported 
before. 
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Riley decision; having been told of the decision, participants expected more 
privacy on both measures.123 See Table 3 for means. This main effect of 
telling participants about Riley was qualified by an interaction with whether 
the participant reported having previously been aware of it.124 Though all 
participants had greater privacy expectations after having been told of the 
Riley decision, this change was greatest when the participant reported no 
prior knowledge of the case.125  
 
Table 3: Electronic Search Expectations Before and After Having Been 
Told About Riley 
 
  Informed About Riley 
  Prior Knowledge Pre Post 
Expectation No 2.83 (.03) 3.67 (.03) 
  Yes 2.83 (.05) 3.24 (.05) 
Warrant No 0.67 (.01) 0.84 (.01) 
 Yes 0.67 (.01) 0.73 (.01) 
Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). 
 
These results provide something of a cautionary tale for the 
measurement of circularity in Fourth Amendment attitudes. As we saw 
above, only a small subset of people actually changed their expectations in 
the wake of the Riley decision, and this change in their expectations was 
short-lived. But this alternative method of assessing circularity, telling 
people what the Supreme Court said and then immediately asking them 
about the subject, yields a very different answer. Since the question of 
circularity is motivated by a concern that general public surveys of privacy 
attitudes will be confounded by Supreme Court decisions, it is the former 
                                                 
123 Expectation: F(1, 3421) = 438.33, p < .001 η2 = .114. 
Warrant: F(1, 3421) = 167.75, p < .001 η2 = .047. 
124 Expectation: F(1, 3421) = 52.13, p < .001 η2 = .015. Warrant: F(1, 3421) = 
37.43, p < .001 η2 = .011. 
125 The means in the “pre” column are identical across knowledge conditions. 
Recall that knowledge of Riley was not associated with greater privacy 
expectations in Waves III and IV; it was actually non-significantly in the other 
direction. Since this analysis collapses across waves, the positive relationship 
between Riley-knowledge and privacy expectations in Wave II gets washed out by 
the other two waves.  
40 Kugler & Strahilevitz [23-Feb-17 
method, which does not beat participants over the head with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning, that is appropriate. 
E.  Comparison to Another Domain: Hobby Lobby 
A very prominent case involving the Affordable Care Act’s 
contraception mandate, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,126 was decided 
June 30, 2014, five days after Riley and one day before Wave II. Since 
Waves I and II were going to bracket that case as well as Riley, we also 
asked about it in each of our survey waves. The response to this case 
underscores the relatively modest effect that the Supreme Court sometimes 
has on public attitudes, and also highlights differences across legal domains. 
We explained the question at stake in Hobby Lobby like this: 
Federal law requires large employers to offer health 
insurance coverage to their full-time workers. By law, 
employer-sponsored health insurance plans must cover the 
costs of certain medical procedures for any employees who 
wish to obtain them. A separate federal law, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, prevents the government from 
imposing substantial burdens on the sincere exercise of 
religious rights without a compelling justification. 
Imagine the owners of a family-owned, for-profit 
business with 13,000 employees sincerely object on 
religious grounds to providing one of the following medical 
procedures as part of the company’s health insurance plan.  
The described company is modeled after Hobby Lobby itself. After this 
prompt, participants were asked whether such a company should be able to 
exclude from its healthcare plan coverage for three different medical 
services: abortion, birth control, and flu shots. For each service, participants 
responded on a 5-point scale that ranged from “Definitely Not” (1) to 
“Definitely Yes,” (5) with a midpoint of 3. The three different types 
treatment were included to assess whether any effect found on the one 
immediately at issue in the case, birth control, would generalize to others. In 
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that a for-profit company could 
invoke the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s protections to resist a 
mandate that its health insurance plan cover contraceptives. 
 
                                                 
126 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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Table 4: Responses to the Hobby Lobby Questions 
 
Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV 
Abortion 2.97   (.06) 3.11   (.06) 3.13   (.04) 3.01   (.05) 
Birth Control 2.62 ab (.06) 2.77 b (.06) 2.75 b (.04) 2.60 a (.05) 
Flu Shot 2.30  (.06) 2.23  (.06) 2.35  (.04) 2.26  (.04) 
Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). If a measure differs significantly across 
condition, scores on that measure that do not share a subscript are significantly different 
from each other. 
 
The same type of ANCOVA that was employed to measure cross wave 
differences on the Riley questions was also used here. There were no 
significant differences across waves for the abortion and flu shot questions, 
and, as can be seen in Table 4, the differences that were observed on the 
birth control question were small and hard to interpret.127 An inspection of 
the means suggests that the public’s understanding of the law moved in the 
direction of the Court’s decision between Waves I and II, the immediate 
before and after waves, and then moved back to its initial level of support 
for religious exceptions in Wave IV. But the change between Waves I and II 
is nonsignificant, and the only significant difference is between Wave IV 
and the two waves that immediately preceded it. 
Unlike in the Riley case, here we do not have a significant attitudinal 
move in the direction of the decision the Supreme Court reached.128 There 
could be any number of reasons for this. Perhaps the public had stronger 
and more divided initial opinions in Hobby Lobby; it was, after all, a 5–4 
decision. Or perhaps something in our description of the issue polarized 
respondents. We return to the possibility of polarization in the conclusion. 
Two patterns from Riley do hold, however, as seen in Table 5. First, 
those in Waves II–IV who reported having heard of the decision were more 
likely to support the Court’s outcome in favor of the employer. Unlike last 
time, however, there is no interaction here between knowledge and study 
wave; the size of the knowledge effect does not differ across waves. 
Second, after participants were told of the Court’s holding (here, as with 
                                                 
127 Abortion, F(3, 4118) = 2.24, p = .08 η2 = .002. 
Birth Control, F(3, 4118) = 3.05, p < .05 η2 = .002. 
Flu Shot, F(3, 4118) = 1.23, p = .30 η2 = .001. 
128 This response replicates what Huq and Mentovich found in a longitudinal study 
of Hobby Lobby conducted on Mechanical Turk. See Huq & Mentovich, supra 
note 66, at 40.  
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Riley we readministered the main dependent measures after telling 
participants of the holding) they shifted substantially in the direction of it. 
Table 5: Effect of Hobby Lobby Knowledge on Post-Decision Views 
 
 
Prior Knowledge of Hobby Lobby 
    
 
Yes No df F 
 
η2 
Abortion 3.19 (.04) 2.96 (.04) 1, 3415 12.73 *** .004 
Birth Control 2.79 (.04) 2.60 (.04) 1, 3415 10.57 ** .003 
Flu Shot 2.32 (.04) 2.23 (.04) 1, 3415 2.76 + .001 
      
   
 
Informed About Hobby Lobby 
 in Study 
    
 
Pre Post df F 
 
η2 
Abortion 3.07 (.03) 3.29 (.03) 1, 3420 50.73 *** .015 
Birth Control 2.70 (.03) 3.13 (.03) 1, 3420 178.85 *** .050 
Flu Shot 2.28 (.03) 2.66 (.03) 1, 3420 169.41 *** .047 
Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). 
 
One other revealing note regarding this data is that more people reported 
having heard of Hobby Lobby than of Riley: 65% in Wave II, and 46% and 
42% in Waves III and IV respectively. This makes a substantial amount of 
sense; Hobby Lobby was the main Affordable Care Act case of its term and 
it addressed high political salience questions regarding reproductive rights 
and freedom of religion.  
 
 IV.) IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The attitudinal circularity hypothesis has been articulated so often and 
so widely as to make it almost axiomatic among lawyers and scholars who 
work on Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet it remained untested. Our study 
of the popular response to Riley presented a golden opportunity to finally 
see how actual people reacted to a major change in privacy law. Fourth 
Amendment cases are rarely front-page news, rarely concern a topic that is 
both salient and readily comprehensible to laypeople, and are rarely unified. 
In Riley v. California the stars were perfectly aligned: the news was on the 
front page, smartphones are ubiquitous, and the Court was unanimous. And, 
even under these favorable conditions, the attitudinal circularity hypothesis 
failed with flying colors. 
Based on our data, the most that can be said on behalf of the attitudinal 
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circularity hypothesis is when the Supreme Court speaks prominently and 
unanimously in a manner that expands privacy rights, that expansion will be 
noticed by a minority of the public a week after the decision. Once a year, 
or two, has passed, the effect of the decision on popular expectations will 
have disappeared entirely. And decisions like Riley that involve one form of 
electronic surveillance do not have even short-term effects on popular 
attitudes about other forms. Recall that scholars have taken a broad view of 
the significance of Riley whereas the public’s expectations about related 
searches did not change in response to it. Any attitudinal circularity that 
exists in Fourth Amendment law is short-lived and limited, even with 
respect to high-profile, surprising, and unanimous decisions like Riley. 
The absence of any long-term attitudinal circularity significantly 
buttresses the case for approaches to Katz that include public sentiment as a 
relevant or even decisive factor in determining whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists. Popular beliefs about police surveillance seem 
to be very stable, and this stability makes them a potentially useful source 
of data for judges seeking to benefit from the wisdom of the crowds. 
In addition to refuting a widely-held belief in legal circles, our study 
also contributes to the political science literature on how the public 
responds to Supreme Court decisions. Recall the recent emergence of an 
important hypothesis in political science – the thermostatic model – which 
posits that when the Supreme Court moves in one direction, public opinion 
will immediately shift in the other direction, but then gradually follow the 
Court over the long run.129 Our data indicate precisely the opposite 
dynamic, at least in this particular context. Our data are also in significant 
tension with the older legitimacy theory of popular response to Supreme 
Court decisions.130 If anything, the data seem consistent with research 
suggesting that the Supreme Court’s decisions do little to influence popular 
opinion over the long run.131  
One theory that we cannot address with our Riley data is the structural 
response model. None of the personality or demographic measures sampled 
in Wave I predicted both initial expectations and perceived warrant 
requirements.132 We therefore cannot neatly divide our sample into groups 
                                                 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 47–52. 
131 See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
(1989); Johnson & Martin, supra note 67, at 306-07; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Book 
Review, The Wonder of It All, 45 TULSA L. REV. 679, 686-87 (2009). 
132 One personality measure, Rightwing Authoritarianism, predicted warrant 
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prone to support and oppose the decision and compare the reactions of those 
groups once the decision was published. Our Hobby Lobby data, however, 
do allow for that kind of analysis. Though most demographics were entirely 
irrelevant to views on the critical issue – support for the birth control 
exemption – overall liberalism or conservatism was highly predictive in 
Wave I. A regression analysis then showed that the effect of political 
orientation became stronger in Wave II, meaning that liberals and 
conservatives differed more in Wave II than they did in Wave I. In Wave III 
the difference returned to baseline before it actually reversed slightly in 
Wave IV. The principal result here is displayed in Figure 3 with liberal and 
conservative being estimated at the scale endpoints. Note the spreading of 
the liberal and conservative lines in the immediate post-decision data 
collection and then the gradual return to initial attitudes. The full regression 
analysis is reported in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 3: Support for a Birth Control Exemption Across Waves 
 
Our data from both Riley and Hobby Lobby most neatly support a 
narrative based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion.133 In 
the case of Riley, some portion of the population hears of the outcome 
immediately after the decision and, based on a general liking and respect for 
the Court, changes its view. But this persuasion is based on a peripheral 
cue, liking for the source, and is not deeply processed or understood. This 
                                                                                                                            
perceived warrant requirements but not the expectations measures. 
133 See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
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explains both why the population does not generalize from the specific 
holding to other searches – they aren’t thinking enough about the subject to 
see the connections that are so obvious to experts – and also why the 
persuasion is so fleeting. Our findings on Hobby Lobby actually point in the 
same direction. Though we observe an initial effect that is consistent with 
the structural response model, that effect fades quickly. Again, this shows a 
fundamentally shallow and limited effect, likely a function of shallow and 
limited processing of the decision. Though Hoekstra’s ELM-based 
theorizing ultimately produced mixed results,134 our data suggest it may be 
a fruitful model for future exploration.  
More important than our contribution to a general understanding of the 
effects of Supreme Court decisions is our ability to weigh in on a domain 
where the legal doctrine directly incorporates popular beliefs. As a doctrinal 
matter, the beliefs of voters about the First Amendment or gun rights or 
separation of powers are irrelevant; the Supreme Court can be and often is 
counter-majoritarian. The relevance of public attitudes, if any, would be 
indirect and derive from a legal realist conception that the Supreme Court 
often follows public opinion.135 But in a couple domains of constitutional 
law – search and seizure law as well as capital punishment, and maybe gay 
rights – the Supreme Court has made popular beliefs doctrinally relevant, or 
even decisive.136 Riley is therefore the rare case where popular beliefs about 
what the law is can be directly relevant to the legal question before the 
Court. And here we have a clear result: the influence of a Fourth 
                                                 
134 See HOEKSTRA, supra note 53, at 112-14. Recall that the data in two of her 
cases saw a shift in the Court’s direction and two did not. She had actually made a 
more complicated prediction – that the shift would occur in communities 
neighboring those immediately involved because they would be exposed to the 
decision in popular coverage but not have the self-interest motivations of the 
communities immediately involved – but that was not supported. 
135 See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 260 
(5th ed. 2010) (revised by Sanford Levinson) (“[I]t is hard to find a single 
historical instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really 
clear wave of public demand.”).  
136 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (deciding that 
squeezing a bus passenger’s bag is a Fourth Amendment search based on the 
expectations that an ordinary passenger would have); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 564-68 (2005) (striking down the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (noting the relevance under the Equal Protection Clause of 
“new insights and understandings [that] can reveal unjustified inequality within our 
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged”). 
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Amendment Supreme Court decision on public attitudes is minimal. 
That said, our study still leaves some questions unresolved. When the 
Supreme Court articulated the hypothesis of attitudinal circularity in Smith 
v. Maryland it did so against a backdrop of a government pronouncement 
that existing privacy rights had been erased.137 In Riley a substantial change 
in privacy law occurred, but in the opposite direction. The Supreme Court 
told the public that they had greater privacy rights in their cell phones than 
previous judicial pronouncements had indicated. It is possible that the 
popular response to Fourth Amendment decisions is asymmetric, such that a 
different dynamic emerges when the government decreases privacy 
protections instead of increasing them. Were the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari in a decision that gave it grounds to overrule Katz or Riley, there 
would be an opportunity to look for such asymmetries.138 Similarly, we 
could look for such an asymmetry if the executive announced a new 
restriction on privacy rights. Until such an opportunity to test the effects of 
                                                 
137 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
138 The Supreme Court does not diminish privacy expectations very often in highly 
salient cases, but Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was a famous 
example of them arguably pegging legal expectations of privacy below extant 
popular expectations of privacy. The wiretapping that federal agents conducted in 
Olmstead was a violation of the laws of Washington state, where Olmstead resided 
and did business. Id. at 468-69. For that reason, the legally sophisticated Olmstead 
believed that even though the government could be wiretapping his calls, evidence 
gleaned from those calls could not be used to prosecute him. See DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 272 (5th ed. 2015). 
Dissenting in Olmstead, Justice Holmes noted that in his view the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the federal government’s introduction of evidence that was 
gathered in violation of state law. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). Arguably, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which held that 
the police do not need a warrant to install a pen registry that tracks all the numbers 
dialed by a telephone customer, and California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), 
which held that the police do not need a warrant to search the trash left outside 
people’s homes, were other salient examples of the same phenomenon. Even 
several years after Greenwood was decided, Slobogin and Schumacher found that 
survey respondents continued to regard the police search of the garbage outside 
someone’s home as moderately intrusive. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 4, 
at 738 tbl. 1. Other cases where the Court’s result would have plausibly surprised 
most Americans concern issues that we suspect were not particularly salient to the 
average person. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (no expectation of 
privacy against aerial surveillance of a greenhouse on private property), United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no expectation of privacy against the 
recording of a conversation with an undercover informant). 
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a reverse-Riley decision arises, however, our best assumption is that the 
public would respond to privacy-diminishing decisions in much the same 
way it responds to privacy-enhancing decisions.  
The evidence we report here provides support for neither the weak 
version (slow moving shifts in expectations) nor strong version (prompt 
shifts in expectations) of the attitudinal circularity hypothesis. That said, our 
study provides a better test of the strong version of circularity. We feel that 
by studying the effects of a landmark ruling one week, one year, and two 
years after the decision we have given circularity a fair shake. We picked up 
the immediate effect, such as it was, and then gave the effect time to either 
magnify, as word spread, or dissipate, as memories faded. Admittedly, it is 
possible that the lasting effects of Riley on the public’s expectations will 
emerge after five years, or ten, or twenty. We will continue to insert the 
questions we have posed here into nationally representative surveys in the 
coming years, and if a shift occurs, we will write about it. That said, the 
greater the temporal distance between a decision and a survey, the harder it 
is to conclude that any shifts in popular beliefs can be traced to the decision 
(or implementations of the decision) as opposed to other confounding 
factors. People who insist that the effects of a Supreme Court decision on 
popular expectations will emerge only after a decade or two are articulating 
a non-falsifiable hypothesis.  
Even if circularity operates on a generational timescale, it would be 
wise to ask whether this dynamic gives rise to the original problem that 
concerned circularity proponents. Privacy expectations must come from 
somewhere. Presumably they are a product of, among other factors, cultural 
norms, technological capabilities, and political policies. If expectations 
update over time to reflect changing realities, this is to the public’s credit. 
As we explained in Part I, circularity becomes a problem only if 
expectations update quickly enough that it becomes incoherent to ask 
government actors to consider what the public thinks. The data presented 
here go a long way toward showing that public beliefs are more stable than 
that caricature assumes.  
Our refutation of the attitudinal circularity hypothesis is not perfect, but 
we think our evidence are as convincing as any data are likely to get for the 
foreseeable future. To the extent that the law pays attention to empirical 
reality, the burden of proof has now shifted to those seeking to demonstrate 
that Fourth Amendment circularity is genuine. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Though privacy expectations can change somewhat immediately after a 
major Fourth Amendment decision, the change is concentrated among those 
who have explicit knowledge of the Supreme Court decision. Over time, 
this explicit knowledge appears to be forgotten, and expectations return to 
baseline. Therefore the Supreme Court would not be “talking to itself” if it 
incorporated public expectations into its doctrinal analysis; privacy 
expectations appear to operate largely independently of changes in Supreme 
Court doctrine. Though the idea of reasonable expectations of privacy’s 
circularity is widely repeated among scholars and even the justices 
themselves, the first reliable empirical evidence indicates that, at best, the 
phenomenon is very short-lived. In the medium-term, Fourth Amendment 
circularity is a myth. 
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 APPENDIX 
Sample Demographics: 
In the first three waves, close attention was paid to age, ethnicity, and sex. 
Following the census convention, “Hispanic” was asked separate from the 
racial categories and “Sex” required a binary answer. In Wave IV, the 
sample was also carefully matched on educational attainment and regional 
representation. This made it important to control for education in cross-
wave comparisons; though more carefully matching the census on 
educational attainment was desirable, it did lead to an inconsistency across 
time periods. Though there are some other minor variations in 
representation across waves, only educational attainment shows a major 
shift. 
  
Wave 
  
I II III IV 
 % Female 51.71   51.06   50.18   52.55   
Age (years) Median 46   52   47   46   
  Mean 46.28 (16.74) 50.48 (16.57) 46.30 (16.42) 46.18 (16.94) 
Political 
Orientation139  
Economic 4.15 (1.67) 4.30 (1.77) 4.32 (1.78) 4.29 (1.72) 
Social 3.83 (1.76) 3.96 (1.85) 4.07 (1.92) 4.08 (1.81) 
Overall 3.98 (1.64) 4.12 (1.70) 4.19 (1.79) 4.20 (1.69) 
Race/Ethnicity White 81.14   79.92   79.63   79.21   
  Black or AA 9.86   13.16   13.30   11.82   
  Indian or Native 1.86   1.46   2.00   2.40   
  SE Asian 4.57   4.52   4.15   2.86   
  Hawaiian/Pacific 1.00   0.40   0.57   0.31   
  Hispanic 16.71   16.76   17.08   17.16   
Education Less than HS 2.00   1.20   2.00   10.97   
  HS Diploma/GED 30.57   34.04   34.31   32.61   
  2 Year College 25.57   21.28   23.30   29.13   
  4 Year College 28.14   29.12   28.02   18.08   
  Graduate Degree 13.71   14.36   12.37   9.20   
Know Riley   -   40.29   21.09   22.41   
N   700   751   1399   1294   
For age and political orientation, the numbers in parentheses represent 
standard deviations. 
                                                 
139 Measured on seven point scales ranging from 1 Very Liberal to 7 Very 
Conservative. 
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Hobby Lobby Regression 
A regression analysis was conducted of the Wave I data to determine 
whether any demographic or attitudinal factor sufficiently predicted views 
of the birth control exemption to allow for the kind of analysis required to 
test the structural response model. As can be seen in Table A1 below, the 
measure of political orientation had the strongest predictive power in Wave 
I. 
Table A1: Predictions of support in Wave I for the birth control exemption 
as a function of demographic and attitudinal variables. 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t   B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) 2.297 .142   16.138   
Political 
Orientation .357 .014 .378 25.405 *** 
Sex -.310 .048 -.095 -6.517 *** 
Age -.001 .001 -.009 -.590   
Black .189 .072 .038 2.645 ** 
Hispanic .124 .063 .029 1.962 * 
Education .096 .022 .066 4.428 *** 
Authoritarianism .041 .026 .024 1.581   
SC Knowledge .095 .075 .019 1.255   
 
A further regression was therefore conducted to examine whether the effect 
of political orientation changed across wave, as the structural response 
model predicted using the demographic factors controls. As can be seen in 
the next Table, the main effect of political orientation was qualified by 
interactions in the second and fourth waves, indicating that the effect was 
larger in Wave II and smaller in Wave IV. Political orientation was centered 
at 0 before this analysis was conducted, so it ranged from -3 to +3. 
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Table A2: Predictions of Support for the Birth Control Exemption as a 
Function of Political Orientation and its Interactions by Wave. 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t   B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) 2.488 .117   21.320   
Political Orientation .374 .034 .395 10.942 *** 
Wave2 .109 .078 .026 1.399   
Wave3 .054 .069 .016 .789   
Wave4 -.079 .070 -.023 -1.123   
Wave2 by Political Orientation .105 .047 .047 2.245 * 
Wave3 by Political Orientation .001 .041 .001 .035   
Wave4 by Political Orientation -.100 .042 -.058 -2.382 * 
Sex -.301 .047 -.093 -6.406 *** 
Age -.001 .001 -.006 -.379   
Black .189 .071 .038 2.647 ** 
Hispanic .110 .063 .025 1.746   
Education .088 .021 .060 4.132 *** 
 
To generate means for the figure presented in the paper, the value of the 
demographic variables was estimated at their means and the values for 
Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative were estimated at -3, 0 and +3 
respectively. This produced the following set of values. 
 
Table A3: Estimates of Support for Birth Control Exemption by Wave and 
Political Orientation. 
  
Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Wave I 1.50 2.62 3.74 
 
II 1.29 2.73 4.17 
 
III 1.55 2.67 3.80 
 
IV 1.72 2.54 3.36 
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Questionnaire Items 
1. Full list of searches: 
• Physical searches 
o Search his car for any packages he might be carrying 
and open the packages. 
o Open his briefcase or backpack to check whether it 
contains drugs.  
o Fingerprint him. 
o Open his backpack, find his diary, and read the diary 
to see if it contains anything incriminating. 
o Take a DNA sample using a mouth swab. 
o Take a blood sample. 
o Strip search him. 
o Perform a body cavity search on him. 
• Electronic searches 
o Power on the phone and see what the start-up screen 
displays.  
o Turn off the phone to prevent its contents from being 
encrypted or deleted  
o Search the phone for a list of most recent calls.  
o Search the phone for the 10 most recent text 
messages.  
o Search the entire text message history.  
o Search the phone’s browser for a list of recent 
Google searches.  
o Use the phone to access his email account and read 
his emails.  
o Use the phone to open his Facebook app and read his 
newsfeed and messages.  
o Subject the phone to a forensic examination to 
recover any pictures, documents, and emails that the arrestee 
may have deleted.  
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2. GPS tracking questions: 
• Used a car's onboard GPS system to locate it on public 
streets at a single moment in time without the owner's permission?  
• Used a car's onboard GPS system to track its movements on 
public streets for one day without the owner's permission?  
• Same, but for one week?  
• Same, but for one month?  
3. Other Reasonable Expectation of privacy questions 
• Used remote activation software to turn on the webcam on a 
suspect's laptop without their permission?  
• Obtained from an Internet Service Provider copies of emails 
exchanged between two suspects in a criminal investigation?  
• Select "Definitely Not" for this line to show that you read the 
question.  
• Used facial recognition software to check whether any of the 
fans entering the Super Bowl stadium match images of known 
terrorists?  
• Installed a video camera to watch a public park where 
criminal activity has recently occurred?  
• Obtained from a robbery suspect’s cell phone company 
stored information about whether the suspect’s cell phone was near 
the crime scene when the robbery was committed?  
• Used a fake cell tower to trick a suspect's phone into giving 
the police more accurate information about where the phone is?  
• Searched a hotel’s guest register to obtain the names, home 
addresses, and assigned hotel room numbers of the guests who 
stayed there on a particular night?  
4. Rightwing Authoritarianism 
• It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy 
authority. (RC) 
• What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone 
following our leaders in unity.  
• Students at high schools and at university must be 
encouraged to challenge, criticize, and confront established 
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authorities. (RC) 
• Obedience and respect for authority are the most important 
virtues children should learn.  
• Our country will be great if we show respect for authority 
and obey our leaders.  
• People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws 
they don’t agree with. (RC) 
5. Supreme Court Knowledge: 
• Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court? 
o Antonin Scalia 
o John Roberts  
o William Rehnquist  
o Elena Kagan  
• How many Justices currently sit on the United States 
Supreme Court? ___140 
• Which of the following voted to uphold the individual 
mandate portion of the Affordable Care Act (also known as 
"Obamacare") in 2012? 
o Clarence Thomas  
o David Souter  
o John Roberts 
o Anthony Kennedy 
• How many women currently sit on the United States 
Supreme Court?____ 
6. Riley Knowledge Question 
• On June 25, 2014, the US Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Riley v. California. The Court decided whether a warrant 
was required before the police could search the cell phone of 
someone they had just arrested. Had you heard about the Supreme 
Court's decision in that case prior to this survey? (Yes/No) 
                                                 
140 Unexpectedly the correct answer to this question changed between Waves III 
and IV. 
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7. Riley Holding 
• In Riley v. California the US Supreme Court decided that the 
police generally must get a warrant before examining the 
information on a person’s cell phone, even if that person has just 
been arrested. In light of this information, please re-answer the 
question on the next page. 
8. Hobby Lobby Policy Questions 
• If they sincerely object to providing coverage for 
ABORTION, should they be able to exclude that from their 
healthcare plan? 
• If they sincerely object to providing coverage for BIRTH 
CONTROL PILLS, should they be able to exclude them from their 
healthcare plan? 
• If they sincerely object to providing coverage for FLU 
SHOTS, should they be able to exclude them from their healthcare 
plan? 
9. Hobby Lobby Knowledge Question 
• On June 30, 2014, the US Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. The Court decided 
whether a for-profit company whose owners sincerely objected on 
religious grounds to providing its employees with insurance 
coverage for contraceptives nevertheless had to provide such 
coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Had you heard about the 
Supreme Court’s decision in that case prior to this survey? 
10. Hobby Lobby Holding 
• In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby the US Supreme Court decided 
that while all large for-profit employers are ordinarily required to 
provide health insurance coverage for contraceptives to their full-
time employees, the government could not significantly penalize a 
corporation whose owners refused to provide contraceptive coverage 
because of the owners’ sincere religious objections. In light of this 
information, please re-answer the question on the next page. 
 
